March 2026 newsletter: Trump Goes to War, Putin Reaps the Reward

The fallout of the U.S.-Israeli war in Iran and its implications for global geopolitics

Dear Friends and Colleagues,

We are now more than four weeks into the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran. Despite President Trump’s claims that the U.S. has “won” and achieved “regime change” in Tehran, the war continues and the theocratic regime remains in place.

As I said in my last newsletter, I do not support this war. We faced no imminent threat from Iran and had not exhausted all other non-military means to achieve our objectives. President Trump has yet to clearly explain to the American people why he has taken us into a war with Iran, and why now. As I wrote in A War Still in Search of a Mission, the administration has floated various justifications in the hope that one will stick. These include: pursuing regime change; destroying Iran’s nuclear program (which we were told last June had been “obliterated”); eliminating Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal (in effect, conventional disarmament); stopping Tehran from funding terrorist groups; responding to decades of Iranian attacks against Americans; and finally—according to Secretary of State Marco Rubio—that Israel made us do it.

Iran’s response to U.S.-Israeli strikes has included strikes against our allies throughout the region, as well as effectively deploying Shahed attack drones alongside missiles to shutter the Strait of Hormuz. The threat posed by these drones appears to have taken the U.S. by surprise—but it shouldn’t have. Russia’s war against Ukraine has provided four years of data on the utility of unmanned systems; nothing moves on the battlefield in Ukraine without being attacked by drones. Yet when President Volodymyr Zelenskyy offered to share Ukraine’s hard-earned anti-drone expertise with the United States (including battling Shahed drones), President Trump said he was “the last person we need help from.” As I argued in What the U.S. and the Free World Could Learn from Ukraine on Drone Warfare, this response was both arrogant and short-sighted.

Just as Trump seems willing to belittle Zelenskyy at every opportunity he gets, he continues to show striking deference to Russian leader Vladimir Putin. This was evidenced by his indifferent response to reports that Russia is providing targeting data to Iran that could be used against U.S. military assets. Rather than expressing concern or outrage, Trump administration officials shrugged it off: U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff said the Russians had assured him they weren’t doing this and that the U.S. can “take them at their word.” Trump himself dismissed a question on the matter as “stupid.” If Putin is aiding an adversary in attacking U.S. forces, there should be consequences for this—as I argued in my essay on this topic (read it here.)

More broadly, Putin is emerging as a clear beneficiary of this war (read more in The Real Winner of Trump’s Iran War So Far? Vladimir Putin). Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have driven up oil prices, generating billions in extra revenue for Russia and bolstering its war chest. The U.S. decision to temporarily ease sanctions on Russian oil is another boost for Putin and has drawn criticism from allies, including Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Meanwhile, U.S. involvement in the Middle East is depleting key munitions stockpiles, including weapons Ukraine had hoped to acquire. Finally, global attention shifting to Iran is pushing the war in Ukraine down the agenda and delaying diplomatic efforts to end it. Taken together, these developments represent a series of strategic wins for Putin. Trump is now even threatening to leave NATO because of its members’ lack of support for his war against Iran. That would be most tragic outcome of this war of choice. I will remain deeply engaged in this public policy debate, hoping that our most important alliance can endure.

The highest cost of Trump’s war in Iran is pulling our attention away from the more major security challenges of China and Russia. As I wrote in Autocrats vs Democrats, we have entered a new era of great power competition in the 21st century. This era includes many challenges that are even greater than those faced during the Cold War. Of the many prescriptions I proposed in the last three chapters of that book that constitute a new American grand strategy, Trump is doing the opposite. On the details, you can get the book here.

As you can see, much of my work this month has focused on Iran (including my discussion on the war with journalist Chris Mathews on Substack Live)! I did, however, get the chance to discuss more of the ideas in my book with Peter Robinson on the Hoover Institution’s Uncommon Knowledge show. We explored how today’s autocrats think differently from democrats—and how misunderstanding this has contributed to some of America’s biggest foreign‑policy mistakes. I really enjoyed this conversation!

Back to the Classroom

On March 30^th, I taught my first seminar on my course on great power competition. You can check out the syllabus here. This academic year is my 30^th year of teaching at Stanford! Hard to believe. But I feel very grateful for the privilege of working and learning at such a fantastic place. I’ll tell more about how the seminar goes next month!

Thank you for reading—and for your continued engagement.