Our Allies in Europe Are Nervous About a Trump Reelection

My Trip Report from a Week in Berlin and Prague

Last week, I attended conferences in Berlin and Prague to speak about economic sanctions on Russia, the future of BRICS, and the democratic opposition in Russia. Even though both conferences were dedicated to issues of democracy and European security, all anyone really wanted to talk about was Trump. While European colleagues politely asked for my assessment of the presidential race, there was a sense of fatalism in most of these conversations. Many are bracing for Trump’s victory, and they are horrified. 

Of course, the future of Ukraine was at the top of everyone’s mind. Some analysts in the U.S. have convinced themselves that Trump could be good for Ukraine. I met only one European who shared this view. Everyone else predicted disaster. Ukrainians and leaders of states that border Russia—those who know Putin best—reminded me that the Russian dictator will not stop his war of annexation just because the United States ends military assistance to Ukraine. Just the opposite. He will expand his war effort, knowing that Ukraine’s ability to resist will decay with time. Some even predicted Putin making another run at seizing Kyiv. No one had any confidence that Trump could stop him.

But even if President Trump could convince his friend in Moscow to stop fighting in return for more Ukrainian territory and no NATO membership for Ukraine, Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people also get a vote in this deal. And they might not want to swap land for peace, even if Trump insists. The war could drag on for much longer, but with many more Ukrainians being killed.

The future of NATO was another concern my European colleagues raised in almost every conversation if Trump returned to office. Those who live closest to the Russian border repeatedly warned that Putin will not stop in Ukraine but will be tempted to attack them if Trump is in the White House. Putin wouldn’t need to order his soldiers to try to march into downtown Vilnius; he can do something more limited instead, say, an in-and-out special forces operation in Estonia or a missile attack on weapons being transported into Ukraine, and then step back and then wait and see how his friend in the White House responds. A Trump non-response, which many European allies fear, would then spark a crisis of unity within NATO—exactly what Putin wants.  In such a scenario, the most pessimistic Europeans predicted World War III. Western leaders who tried to appease Hitler, they reminded, directly contributed to starting World War II.

As we all spun ourselves up thinking through these scary scenarios, a few Europeans at the meetings tried to calm down the hysteria by reminding us that in the past, the United States had generated more continuity in foreign policy, especially regarding allies in Europe, than discontinuity. Trump’s first term, after all, did not signal a strong pivot away from Obama’s approach to European security.  Back in 2014, Obama, not Trump, was the American president who first articulated the goal of spending a minimum of two percent on defense for all NATO members. Trump just foot-stomped that aspiration. Additionally, in some marginal ways—for instance, providing Javelins to Ukraine—the Trump administration, acting at times without the president’s blessing, did more for Ukrainian security than the Obama administration. (Read more about the unprecedented divide between Trump and his national security team here). That gave some cause for hope.

However, when the discussion turned to divides between Trump and his previous national security team, the conversation quickly pivoted to who would serve in a second Trump administration. That parlor game in Berlin and Prague often ended with the sober conclusion that those in the first Trump administration who pushed for helping Ukraine or maintaining America’s commitment to NATO—people such as National Security Advisors H.R. McMaster and John Bolton, as well as Secretary of Defense James Mattis—would not serve in Trump’s second term. Those currently close Trump, including his running mate JD Vance, are more committed to abandoning Ukraine and distancing from NATO. The sole exception, according to the U.S. watchers in Europe, was Mike Pompeo. After some conversations in Europe, one could have walked away believing that Pompeo was going to serve as Secretary of Defense and National Security Advisor while doing his old job at the State Department all at once!

Maybe Pompeo and his allies in a second Trump administration might save the United States from abandoning Ukraine, quitting NATO, or encouraging a new great power war in Europe through appeasement and weakness. However, there is an easier and more reliable path to avoid such scenarios: elect Vice President Harris.