The United States Needs NATO

Reform it, don’t destroy it.

Note: I’ll be hosting a Substack Live this Friday, April 10 at 11am PDT / 2pm EDT to dive into the core arguments from this latest piece. Paid subscribers are encouraged to leave questions (on NATO or anything else) in the comments below. I’ll prioritize those and try to take additional questions live during the event. More details to follow!

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President Donald Trump has never liked NATO. In his first term, he frequently berated allies and threatened to leave this most enduring alliance in the history of the world. His hostility towards NATO is even more overt in his second term. Shortly after taking office, Trump cut U.S. bilateral assistance to Ukraine, leaving our allies to fend for themselves in stopping Putin’s army in Ukraine so that it does not march further east (though Trump did allow NATO allies to buy some American weapons to give the Ukrainians). Shockingly, at the United Nations, his administration has stopped voting with our NATO allies on resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, instead aligning with Russia and a handful of other autocratic states. Trump and his team, most notably Vice President J.D. Vance at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, have lectured our NATO allies about their alleged imperfections in practicing democracy. Trump even threatened to invade Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO ally Denmark, and to make another NATO ally, Canada, our “51^st state”. The alliance was under severe duress before Trump invaded Iran. But now things have gotten a lot worse.

Buoyed by the successful removal of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, Trump decided in late February to attack Iran without consulting our NATO allies. Perhaps he thought his war would be quick and easy, and therefore that the United States would need only one ally, Israel. Trump and his team probably also reasoned that they would not get a unanimous vote within NATO to support his war of choice—the United States, after all, had not been attacked by Iran. This did not, initially, seem to bother Trump. Amid reports that the UK was mulling sending an aircraft carrier to the Middle East a week into the conflict, Trump said on Truth Social that the U.S. didn’t need it. “We don’t need people that join Wars after we’ve already won,” he added. When it soon became clear that the U.S. had not, in fact, “won”, Trump changed course and called on NATO allies for help, especially with reopening the Strait of Hormuz. That has yet to materialize. On 6 April, Trump said Nato had “actually gone out of their way not to help.”

Trump seemed especially frustrated by some allies, Spain in particular, for not allowing the United States to attack Iran from bases located in their countries, although many NATO allies are allowing such access. In response, he has threatened to withdraw the United States from the alliance. Doing so without Congressional support would be difficult, but not impossible. In formulating foreign policy, the U.S. Constitution gives the President considerable authority. (On the details for how Trump could radically diminish US participation in the alliance without formally withdrawing, read James Goldgeier and Elizabeth Saunders here.)

U.S. withdrawal from NATO as a consequence of Trump’s war in Iran would be a catastrophic mistake for American security interests in Europe and the world. Trump needs to end his brinkmanship towards the alliance. And NATO members in Europe need to find other ways to express their displeasure with Trump’s war in Iran besides denying American access to bases in NATO countries.

The NATO Origins Story

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and 10 European countries, after it became clear that the UN Security Council could not live up to its aspiration of providing collective security. In an echo of our debates about the organization’s expansion today, some American strategists—most notably George Kennan—worried that the creation of NATO would provoke the Kremlin. Others bristled at the idea of signing treaties with former enemies (Italy in 1949; West Germany in 1955). At times, alliance cohesion proved difficult. There was a major dispute between NATO allies during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956; France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military structure in the 1960s; and tensions emerged between Washington and European societies in the 1980s, when US President Ronald Reagan pushed for the deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe. Throughout the Cold War, our European allies were worried whether the United States would come to their defense if the Soviets invaded. In the long run, though, NATO endured and played a vital role in keeping the peace in Europe. The Soviet Union never attacked a NATO country, and NATO never attacked the Soviet Union.

Throughout the Cold War, NATO was also an essential organization in maintaining unity between democracies even if some members only made the transition to democracy after joining the alliance (i.e. Greece, Portugal, Turkey). In the ideological struggle that defined the Cold War, NATO helped to unite the free world. The alliance was anchored in values, not just security.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO continued to play a similar stabilizing role in Europe. Russia has never attacked a NATO ally, and NATO has never attacked Russia. Putin has only invaded European countries in the gray zone between NATO and Russia—Georgia and Ukraine. The only time that a NATO country was attacked—the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001—the alliance voted to defend their American ally. NATO armies joined the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. Soldiers from NATO countries in Europe and Canada fought, and died, alongside American soldiers.

NATO’s central mission has always been defensive, represented in Article 5, which states that an attack on one is an attack on all. The alliance collectively supported the war in Afghanistan because the United States had been attacked on September 11, 2001. But in 2003, when U.S. President George W. Bush decided to invade Iraq, there had been no such attack. In many NATO capitals, Bush’s decision to invade Iraq was thus seen as a war of choice, not a war in defense of an attacked NATO ally. The alliance as a whole did not support the Iraq war, leading to tensions within NATO. For a time, cafeterias in the U.S. Congress served only “freedom fries,” not French fries, because France did not support this war. (Germany also did not endorse Bush’s war, but there was no shunning of German cars or beers!) Nevertheless, the alliance’s leaders rationally and calmly recognized that the long-term benefits of NATO outweighed these short-term differences. In 2004, the alliance even grew—the largest single moment of expansion in NATO’s history.

Why the US Still Benefits from NATO Membership Today

This short history of NATO underscores four past benefits for the United States that still advance American security, prosperity, and values today.

First, NATO still plays an essential role in keeping the peace in Europe. Obviously, NATO did not deter Russian ruler Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine. One must wonder if the alliance could have invited Ukraine to join earlier. Nonetheless, even after more than four years of fighting in Ukraine, Putin has not attacked a NATO country, even when NATO allies are providing military assistance to Ukraine. That peace serves American security interests. We do not want to get dragged into a war in Europe. That tragically has happened twice before in the twentieth century; we cannot let it happen again this century. By maintaining and strengthening NATO’s deterrence posture against Russia, NATO helps to keep the peace. This is “peace through strength,” to quote Reagan. If Trump decides to withdraw from NATO, conflict between Russia and NATO allies, especially in the Baltic states, would be more likely. And eventually, the United States could still get dragged into a wider European war. Better to enhance deterrence now and avoid war than to have to make decisions about joining a war against Russia later.

Second, Europe remains one of America’s most important trading and investment partners. In 2024, based on the latest figures from the American Chamber of Commerce to the EU, European investment in the U.S. reached $3.4 trillion, while American investment in Europe totaled $4 trillion. Total trade in goods and services between the United States and Europe was $2.3 trillion, according to AmCham EU. As the American and Chinese continues to decouple this century, trade and investment between democracies will become an even more important driver of American prosperity. By keeping the peace, NATO creates the permissive conditions for this economic transatlantic activity.

Third, if the United States were ever attacked again, we would want our NATO allies by our side again. To be sure, American military assets outpace European capabilities. But European militaries and weapons are not trivial and hopefully will now grow significantly in the coming years. As UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill said, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” Strong, loyal allies were our greatest advantages during the Cold War. In dealing with China and Russia in this century, we must maintain that advantage.

Fourth, in our new era of great power competition between autocrats and democrats, NATO can still help maintain unity among democracies, as it did during the Cold War. NATO was never just about security. Values played a central role in the founding of the alliance as the preamble of the founding treaty made clear:

“The Parties to this Treaty … are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage,and civilization of their peoples, founded on principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”

Article 2 of the treaty also affirmed:

“The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions.”

After the end of the Cold War, NATO directly facilitated the expansion and consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe. (For more on NATO’s role in expanding democratic values, see my article with Rob Person in the Journal of Democracy here.) As I explain in detail in Autocrats vs Democrats: China, Russia, America and the New Global Disorder, our new era of great power rivalry also has an ideological component. In competing with China and Russia, our democratic ideas constitute one of our greatest comparative advances. Again, to quote Churchill: “democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.…”. Opinion polls show that most people in the world agree with Churchill. The 2025 Democracy Perception Index, which surveyed more than 111,000 people across 100 countries, found that that two-thirds of respondents thought it was very important to have democracy in their country. Maintaining—maybe even strengthening solidarity between countries in the free world—will help. The United States prevail against autocratic China and Russia. The United States cannot throw away this invaluable multilateral institution over a short-term dispute regarding Trump’s war in Iran.

Putin understands the value of NATO to the free world. That’s why he has devoted so many resources to trying to divide the alliance from within. The Kremlin has courted illiberal, anti-NATO populists in Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Romania, Italy, France, Germany, and the United States. Putin wants the alliance to dissolve and is trying to sow seeds of doubt among allies about one another’s credibility. The current crisis within NATO is only helping Putin. It must stop.

Reforming and Strengthening NATO

Just preserving NATO is not enough. NATO must also become more effective, and not just for American national interests but for those of our allies, too. Reforms can enhance the security and prosperity of all members of the NATO alliance.

First, Trump and other NATO leaders must continue to pressure all NATO allies to meet their pledge commitments to spend 5% of their GDP on defense. (Trump, like Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden before him, has rightfully pushed for higher levels of defense spending by all NATO countries. Trump supporters conveniently forget that it was Obama who pushed for the 2% of GDP spending target within NATO after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014. It was during the Biden administration, not Trump’s first term, that most NATO allies achieved this goal, spurred, of course, by Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.)

Second, Washington must push for greater interoperability among allied armed forces. Mobility bottlenecks degrade the alliance’s military capacity, especially in railway infrastructure and airlift capacity. With Finland and Sweden joining as new members, fortifying the northernmost borders of the alliance merits greater attention and resources, especially in the Baltic Sea, where Russian ships have sabotaged undersea cables.

Third, permanently stationing combat forces in all allied countries bordering Russia would signal that acts of aggression against any member of the alliance would trigger a unified response. Such a move is unlikely during the Trump administration but should be embraced by future American leaders.

Fourth, NATO allies in Europe must commit to joint defense production of tanks, long-range fires, drones, air defense systems, and ammunition. (Think of the Airbus model of ownership.) Maintaining production lines of a dozen types of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and howitzers is economically inefficient and inhibits military interoperability. As former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi argued in a study on EU competitiveness, fragmentation “means that the [defense] industry lacks scale, which is essential in a capital-intensive sector with long investment cycles…” and “leads to serious issues related to a lack of standardisation and the interoperability of equipment…”

Fifth, the militaries of all NATO countries must innovate collectively to address new security challenges from AI, cyber weapons, quantum computing, and synthetic biology. Existing programs such as the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) and NATO’s Defense Innovation Fund for the North Atlantic (DIANA) should be expanded to support these lines of effort.

Sixth, U.S. leaders should also support intra-European security initiatives, like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund (EDF). Independent European security initiatives that don’t include the United States also help us in our shared mission.

Seventh, NATO must also expand integration with Ukraine. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are now one of the best-trained, best-armed fighting forces in Europe. If better integrated with NATO defenses, these soldiers could dramatically enhance European security after the Russian war in Ukraine ends. Ukrainian defense companies make some of the best drones in the world. European governments should be contracting with these Ukrainian companies now. Defense companies in NATO—European, American, and Canadian alike— should be seeking ways to create joint ventures and joint production factors with these Ukrainian defense makers. After the war ends, Ukrainian soldiers armed with their sophisticated drones, sensor systems, and other new weapons systems, could be stationed in other NATO countries bordering Russia, and someday maybe even replace American soldiers in these countries. Eventually, Ukraine must become a member of NATO.

The last time the NATO treaty was amended occurred in 1951. That’s a long time ago. To reaffirm a credible commitment from all members, NATO might consider a package of two amendments together. Borrowing from Article One of the UN Charter, the first amendment should state explicitly that no member will ever attack another member. Decades ago, such a treaty obligation would have been self-evident; after Trump’s threats to Denmark, it is necessary. A second amendment could codify more explicitly the rules of access and use of bases within the NATO alliance on a multilateral basis and not only through bilateral agreements.

Back to Basics

NATO’s essence is a defensive alliance. The alliance was designed to prevent wars, not to go to war. When created in 1949, deterring a Soviet attack against European allies was the paramount priority. After the Cold War ended, NATO experimented with adding more to the mission beyond defense. And the only time NATO invoked Article 5 was to launch a war in Afghanistan in response to an attack on the United States by Al Qaeda, which was based in Afghanistan at the time. The communique from the 2024 NATO summit even added language about getting more involved in deterring the People’s Republic of China in Asia. (Strikingly after Trump’s reelection, the 2025 Hague Summit Declaration dropped this language.)

However, in the age of Trump, now is the time to pivot back to NATO’s original core objective of defense and not expand NATO’s ambitions. It’s worth remembering the defensive spirit of Article 5:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Note that Article 5 is invoked when a NATO ally is attacked and not doing the attacking. That’s why NATO has never voted to support wars launched by individual members, such as the French war in Algeria, the American war in Vietnam, the Portuguese wars in Angola and Mozambique, or the US-led war in Iraq. Note also that Article 5 refers to attacks against allies “in Europe or North America,” and thereby does not obligate the alliance to defend allies outside of these territorial domains. The United States obviously did not support France and Great Britain during the Suez crisis in 1956. When Argentina attacked Great Britain in the Falklands War in 1982, the United States did aid its British ally, but the NATO alliance as a whole did not. Returning to this core function—as a defensive alliance for members in Europe and North America—is prudent today. In fact, it may be the only way to save NATO.

To compete effectively in our new era of great power competition, the US needs NATO. Pragmatic leaders must lead the way in reforming and strengthening NATO, not breaking it.

(Parts of this essay was adapted from chapter thirteen of Autocrats vs Democrats: China, Russia, America and the New Global Disorder.)