We probably only know a tenth of what is actually happening in the corridors of power in the Kremlin right now. Lots of history to be written yet.
Putin prefers to work in the shadows and leave the dirty work to others. He recoils at the sight of danger. He is not the person with "a limited sense of danger" that he pretends to be (a remark attributed to his KGB trainers, but most likely a legend spread by Putin himself). He is the little boy who makes a mistake, and winds up running in panic from a Leningrad rat -- all the way back to his apartment.
Putin thought he had a sure thing when he invaded Ukraine. Now he knows he erred badly, and that some of his erstwhile supporters must think him delusional. He doesn't know what to do. Doubling down won't work anymore.
I doubt that we are going to help him out of his quandry. Perhaps some of those closest to him will.
At first it looked like sending Prigozhin to Belarus was punishment, but what if it was a Kremlin plan to turn into a new recruiting ground for Wagner? It will be interesting to watch things unfold over the next weeks/months.
For a lively, informative read on the historical context of last week's mutiny, there's this, from the excellent UK writer/historian Simon Sebag Montefiore. Vanity Fair gives one free read, so this link should work:
There is an interesting side to this whole episode. Some people asked me, “wouldn’t it be great to bring Putin down and replace him with Prigozhin?” I gulped and said emphatically “NO!” That comment made me think about how little people know about Wagner, Prigozhin, etc. I assume anyone in power in the US knows better, but it raises an interesting question that harkens back to the Cold War. Since Russian politics is again a bit opaque, would the US work at some level to help stabilize Putin to prevent a Prigozhin type or worse from coming to power which was a sentiment several times during the Cold War? I know it sounds extreme, but...
Putin’s fate will turn on the outcome of his war against Ukraine, not on Yevgeny Prigozhin. If Putin expands, or even just holds onto, the currently occupied Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, he can spin it as a victory and stay in power. But, if the Ukrainian forces drive to the Sea of Azov and recover significant territory, then Bismarck’s axiom will kick in: “Woe to the leader whose arguments at the end of a war are not as plausible as they were at the beginning.”
We probably only know a tenth of what is actually happening in the corridors of power in the Kremlin right now. Lots of history to be written yet.
Putin prefers to work in the shadows and leave the dirty work to others. He recoils at the sight of danger. He is not the person with "a limited sense of danger" that he pretends to be (a remark attributed to his KGB trainers, but most likely a legend spread by Putin himself). He is the little boy who makes a mistake, and winds up running in panic from a Leningrad rat -- all the way back to his apartment.
Putin thought he had a sure thing when he invaded Ukraine. Now he knows he erred badly, and that some of his erstwhile supporters must think him delusional. He doesn't know what to do. Doubling down won't work anymore.
I doubt that we are going to help him out of his quandry. Perhaps some of those closest to him will.
At first it looked like sending Prigozhin to Belarus was punishment, but what if it was a Kremlin plan to turn into a new recruiting ground for Wagner? It will be interesting to watch things unfold over the next weeks/months.
For a lively, informative read on the historical context of last week's mutiny, there's this, from the excellent UK writer/historian Simon Sebag Montefiore. Vanity Fair gives one free read, so this link should work:
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2023/06/putin-prigozhin-and-russias-long-bloody-history-of-fallen-favorites
There is an interesting side to this whole episode. Some people asked me, “wouldn’t it be great to bring Putin down and replace him with Prigozhin?” I gulped and said emphatically “NO!” That comment made me think about how little people know about Wagner, Prigozhin, etc. I assume anyone in power in the US knows better, but it raises an interesting question that harkens back to the Cold War. Since Russian politics is again a bit opaque, would the US work at some level to help stabilize Putin to prevent a Prigozhin type or worse from coming to power which was a sentiment several times during the Cold War? I know it sounds extreme, but...
Putin’s fate will turn on the outcome of his war against Ukraine, not on Yevgeny Prigozhin. If Putin expands, or even just holds onto, the currently occupied Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, he can spin it as a victory and stay in power. But, if the Ukrainian forces drive to the Sea of Azov and recover significant territory, then Bismarck’s axiom will kick in: “Woe to the leader whose arguments at the end of a war are not as plausible as they were at the beginning.”
Putin the Weak has a nice ring to it but looking over the totality of the Ukrainian War I'd go for Putin the Bungler.