Next Steps for Bringing Ukraine into NATO: Win the War, Meet the Conditions
No More Years of Purgatory and Vague Statements.
Last week’s NATO summit in Vilnius had lots of good news. For the first time, Finland attended the summit as a full member. A last-minute deal on F-16 jets lifted Turkey’s objections to Sweden joining the Alliance, ending two centuries of Swedish neutrality. Several countries also made new pledges of support for Ukraine. France promised to supply Ukraine with long-range cruise missiles and a coalition of 11 countries, led by Denmark and the Netherlands, will start the necessary and long-awaited F-16 training for Ukrainian pilots in August. Alliance unity, at least in public statements, seemed stronger than ever.
The one mixed result concerned the timetable for Ukraine to join NATO. Language at the NATO summit about Ukraine’s eventual membership in the Alliance was better than previous communiques, but not boldly so. That left President Zelenskyy and many Ukrainians disappointed. As he tweeted,
It’s unprecedented and absurd when time frame is not set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine's membership. While at the same time vague wording about "conditions" is added even for inviting Ukraine. It seems there is no readiness neither to invite Ukraine to NATO nor to make it a member of the Alliance.
Zelenskyy’s public expression of disappointment frustrated some NATO leaders, who rightly stated in public and private that they were providing massive military, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, but getting little appreciation for their efforts. At times, the mutual disappointment barbs, unfortunately, seemed emotional and personal, when in fact, these dynamics are structural. Zelenskyy is fighting a war. He of course wants more from the West and faster; President Biden would too if he were in Zelenskyy’s shoes. Biden seeks to avoid dragging the U.S. into a direct conflict with Russia, a position Zelenskyy would likely take were he in Biden’s place. By the end of the summit, however, Biden and Zelenskyy steered everyone to a better place, underscoring that what unites NATO and Ukraine is much greater than what divides them.
Rather than spending the coming weeks and months litigating what went wrong and who was at fault in Vilnius, the better path forward both for NATO and Ukraine (and their non-governmental supporters) is to focus prospectively and prescriptively on what more can be done to advance Ukraine’s membership prospects in the Alliance before the next NATO summit in Washington in 2024. Three tasks are clear.
First, Ukraine must win the war. Biden and other NATO leaders bluntly have stated that they would be unwilling to extend Ukraine an invitation to join the alliance while Putin’s invasion of Ukraine continues. So, NATO allies must do more to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine drive Russian soldiers out of their country. That means supplying Ukraine with more and better weapons, especially F-16 fighter jets, the ATACM longer-range missiles, drones of all kinds, and more of everything – weapons and ammunition – already provided. That also means implementing more and better sanctions, especially regarding the Russian imports of Western technologies used for making weapons. (For details, see the International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, Working Group Paper #12: Strengthening Sanctions to Stop Western Technology from Helping Russia’s Military Industrial Complex, July 3, 2023).
When the war ends, NATO should provide an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance immediately. Doing so will ensure that Putin will not use a ceasefire simply to rebuild his military and launch a future invasion. Neither the Soviet Union nor Russia has ever attacked a NATO ally. Making that pledge now also might help Zelenskyy navigate potentially very difficult negotiations regarding an armistice that some will criticize as just giving Putin time to rebuild his forces and attack again. Zelenskyy will need immediate NATO membership to safeguard against such a scenario and acknowledge Ukrainians’ sacrifice in this tragic, barbaric war. NATO membership, however, should be one element of the post-war package. Others must include reconstruction resources, reparations, and an international commitment to keep prosecuting those who committed war crimes.
Some reasonably worry that tying Ukraine’s NATO membership to the war's conclusion gives Putin an incentive to prolong the war. That logic assumes that keeping Ukraine out of NATO was and remains a top priority for Putin. I don’t see it that way. Putin did not invade Ukraine to stop NATO expansion. After all, NATO has not taken any concrete steps towards Ukrainian membership in the Alliance since the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 (and even that step was a very convoluted one). And “if Russia really feared NATO as a military threat,” as NATO expert James Goldgeier writes here, then “it wouldn’t have moved so many of its troops from the north down to Ukraine. NATO is a defensive alliance, and Putin’s decisions on these military deployments since February 2022 suggest he understands that fact quite well.”
Putin had other goals. (For details, see What Putin Fears Most.) Today, Putin has witnessed a deep level of military engagement between Ukraine and NATO that will never be reversed. He will have other higher priorities on his list for a peace settlement – staying in power, lifting sanctions, securing other concessions if negotiated (like a pledge to unite Ukraine only by peaceful means) – rather than stopping Ukraine’s membership into NATO.
And in addition, it’s just a political reality for many NATO leaders – democratically elected leaders – that their public will not support Ukraine’s membership in NATO while the war continues. So ending the war is a necessary condition for advancing Ukraine’s membership in NATO.
Second, before the war ends, NATO leaders must more transparently spell out the conditions that Ukraine needs to meet to join the alliance. This phrase in the NATO Vilnius communique — “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met” — is too ambiguous. What conditions? Specifically, what democratic changes, or rule of law improvements, or security sector reforms are needed for Ukraine to qualify? NATO should spell out these reforms in detail. (Obviously, the bar for Ukraine cannot be higher than for other NATO members.) NATO could even publish a checklist on an updatable website. The Ukrainian government could then report on progress, complete with its own public website. And then third parties – non-governmental organizations from both Ukraine and NATO countries could track progress using their independent measures and analytics. The more clarity and transparency on the conditions for joining, the better. Work toward meeting these conditions could begin now, and hopefully be completed before the war ends.
Third, Ukrainian and NATO leaders must now think of every future NATO summit as an opportunity to make concrete process toward Ukraine’s membership. We must never allow years of purgatory – from Bucharest in 2008 to Vilnius in 2023 – again. Vilnius was just that, even if it was a smaller step than many would have liked. Momentum has been established. Now is the time to keep pushing forward. The Washington NATO Summit is just a short time away.
Nice to read your proposed solutions/paths forward, let's hope to see some or all of them in the near future.
What I still don't understand is why an invitation to Ukraine into NATO is seen as bringing the US or other members into the war; from what I understand, Article 5 doesn't kick in until actual, official membership, which would take time (years?). Wouldn't the benefits of inviting them outweigh whatever worries the Biden Admin. has on this?
Well-written article.
Some additional extemporaneous thoughts:
Unfortunately, some of the Biden Administration’s policy implementation processes (e.g. sequential response is not strategic in this circumstance) and public comments continue to convey uncertainty and irresoluteness and allow for the perception that Moscow is dictating US policy and that the president is ceding escalation dominance to the Russians.
Don’t state what we will not do—alternatively do what is required and accordingly project US power and confidence. Aiming to win a war is the best way to fight it—Escalation dominance (or the perception of it)should not be ceded to the opponent. Self-deterrence is not an efficacious policy.
Freedom of navigation has served as a principle of the post-World War II system of world order and is our guiding doctrinal strategy in the Indo-pacific. President Biden should enforce a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP)in the Black Sea. If you’re not willing to enforce this principle in the Black Sea( and geographically it has more NATO territory than it does Russian) what does that convey to Beijing in the Indo-Pacific? The world is watching— and it’s past time to respond. Fundamentally, secure and open the Black Sea— it’s not a Russian lake.