One thing about Putin's KGB, and now the FSB, is that while they are naturally attracted to any target of opportunity, they focus particularly on foreigners who are descended from Russian emigres and do not have diplomatic immunity. For this reason, they might have concentrated their attention on Evan Gershkovich, since he was descended from Soviet emigres and he clearly knew his way around -- perhaps too well.
It should be noted that before Evan, the last US correspondent to be arrested for espionage, Nicholas Daniloff (1986), also had Russian roots. In Daniloff's case, it was a straight up hostage situation, and he was traded within a few weeks for a Russian spy caught in an FBI sting operation.
I also wonder if the FSB is doing more than just banking hostages. It may have been let off the leash, and is pursuing targets wherever its paranoia leads it. Julia Ioffe posits that when the ICC approved an arrest warrant for Putin as a war criminal, something may have snapped. If this turns out to be the case, it will have implications for all foreigners remaining in Russia.
My contacts tell me that besides being a brilliant reporter, Evan also took risks that others might not. I'm not sure what the rules are these days, but he reportedly did a lot of traveling alone. He was investigating a story about PMC Wagner, but according to some accounts he also went to Nizhniy Tagil, the site of Russia's largest tank factory, just before being arrested in Yekaterinburg.
The FSB must have had its eye on him for a long time, and it wouldn't have taken too much to send their paranoia into overdrive. These days, for all we know, the FSB might consider normal journalistic research to be espionage.
I'm sure additional information will come to light that will enable more than speculation about why the Russians arrested Evan. Until then, we can hope the Russians might be thinking of a trade. The rub: there is no Russian prisoner in the US whose name springs immediately to mind.
One thing is for sure: Evan is not a spy, and never has been.
Is everyone really oblivious to the true reason he was arrested? It took Putin three years to serve his dish of revenge. This was personal. But Putin’s timing made his motivation transparently obvious.
That's an interesting theory, but in such cases journalists who offend the authorities by investigating corruption or worse are usually not arrested, they are murdered (Jones, Starovoitova, Klebnikov, Politkovskaya, Shchekochikhin) or have unfortunate accidents (Borovik). In the absence of any real connecting evidence between the two cases (say testimony that Putin was personally monitoring the Gershkovich arrest or that the arrest was timed to the sentencing of Roldugin's money launderers) equally valid theories would include harvesting potential trade bait, or the simple fact that under Putin the FSB is being allowed to run wild. https://cpj.org/europe/russia/
Of course he is trade bait. Putin even spelled out exactly who he wants in return during the Tucker Carlson interview but he was just trolling. That assassin will not be released by the Germans. Did you read Evan’s Moscow Times article btw? I understand it made Evan’s mother very nervous. With good reason. On March 30, 2023 it was reported both that the money launderers were sentenced and that Evan had gone missing. And there ARE news reports that Putin was personally monitoring Evan’s arrest. No “testimony” from Putin or FSB about that little operation on March 30 and it is very unlikely there ever will be.
I find stories like Evan's chilling, because when I was working on civil society issues in Russia and Ukraine, I traveled widely in both countries, almost exclusively on my own, and I sometimes found myself in what felt to me like setups. These ranged from being pressured to accept a USB drive without being allowed to review its contents to being put in a situation where I would have to violate seemingly trivial visa restrictions if I wanted to spend an extra night in a city.
Of course, as Mike points out in his essay, the FSB doesn't really need a reason to arrest you, because there isn't really any such thing as "the law" in Russia. However, they do seem to like a pretext, however flimsy, either as a way of demonstrating their contempt for the very idea of legality, or just as a demonstration of how dangerous it is even for foreigners to be anything other than a creature of the Putin regime.
As far as the color revolutions are concerned, it was my experience that Western assistance didn't cause them, but did play a significant role in their success. What's most important to remember about the color revolutions is that they weren't overnight phenomena; they happened in the context of anywhere from 20-25 years' growth of independent civil society.
Many Western countries contributed (relatively small) financial support support for things like building independent parliaments, election monitoring groups, public opinion polling, efforts to engage youth in their countries' civic lives, and so forth. In Ukraine, the case with which I am most familiar, this financial support allowed civil society leaders to build up a reserve of legitimacy and trust with the public.
Thus, when the Kuchma administration (which nobody in Ukraine trusted anyway) tried to waltz blatantly falsified election returns past the public in the second round of the 2004 presidential election, a figure like the late and much-lamented Ilko Kucheriv could go on TV and discuss his foundation's independent election polling for a few minutes, setting off protests that brought the country to a halt for weeks.
Although it's tempting to call these protests "instantaneous," because of the context I mentioned above, they really weren't. They were more like a sudden intensification of an extended period of civic activism.
Of course, there were figures within Ukraine that tried to take advantage of the situation (SOMEBODY must have paid for all those orange flags, for example), but in the main the protests were spontaneous and reflected not just a sense of dissatisfaction, but also a sense that dissatisfaction could be channeled productively. In my view, western aid had its greatest success by fostering this sense of empowerment.
Do you think that Gershkovich’s parents being immigrants from the late 1970s Jewish exodus program could have played a role in Putin’s choice here as well? They are described as “fleeing” the USSR which is a common term of that era, but I just wondered if this might play a role in conjunction with all of the other factors.
How do we reconcile Putin's hatred of democracy and those comments he made about being open to Russia joining NATO? Surely he knew then that the "European culture" he spoke of was democratic and open, not to mention, NATO isn't really about "culture." Seems like his NATO comments were just blowing smoke.
It was early days for Putin then. He was inexperienced and feeling his way. He probably said a lot of things early on that reflected more a loyalty to Yeltsin than his own views. Above all, he had not yet consolidated power, and that was his chief concern. This changed rapidly. By 2005, he was
turning against the US, which was taking actions without considering Russian interests (ABM Treaty abrogation, invasion of Iraq, NATO expansion, etc.). Putin's paranoia was also getting the better of him. He felt surrounded and may not have believed the US was offering Russia sufficient support in the war against terror (Beslan, Chechnya, etc.). He also began to see the US as being behind the color revolutions sweeping parts of the former Soviet Union, and viewed this as a direct threat to his own power. In short, we could have done better.
Could have done better how? The West wasn't behind the color revolutions, and there's evidence that Putin and the FSB were behind some of the "terrorism" in Russia (e.g., the Moscow apartment bombing). Would like to hear more on how we could have done better in these areas (genuine question, not being argumentative!).
I'm not excusing Putin from any of his crimes. I do believe, however, that we could have had far better results if we had been more realistic in our approach to Russia.
You will note that I didn't say we were behind the color revolutions. What I said was "He [Putin] began to see the US as being behind the color revolutions..." Of course, what he thought he saw did not correspond with reality. The problem was that our past behavior made it very easy for him to draw that conclusion.
In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, we could have done much more under the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations to steer Russia under Yeltsin in a more democratic direction. Still worse, we became afflicted by triumphalism and increasingly adopted the view that Russia no longer counted. Even as late as 2016, President Obama, who should have known better, dismissed Russia as a “smaller,” “weaker country” that does not “produce anything that anybody wants to buy except oil and gas and arms...” https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/obama-russia-weaker-country-232759
The worst mistakes were committed by the George W. Bush administration -- errors that made it easy for Putin to come to the conclusion that the US was the enemy. After 9/11, the US turned into a messianic hyperpower, and we began taking unilateral actions that would have serious consequences later on. Some of these could have been better managed. For example, there was no need to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. We could have handled NATO expansion differently (while expanding all the same). We could have paid more attention to Russia's actual problems with terrorism (Beslan, Nord Ost, suicide bombers). The critical error, however, was the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was based on false intelligence, destroyed a Putin ally in the Middle East, and convinced him both through our rhetoric and actions that we were the enemy, out to spread our writ across the world by any means necessary.
We had a crusading mentality. As one Bush national security staffer put it: "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do." https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/faith-certainty-and-the-presidency-of-george-w-bush.html .
Thanks for the response. All of these things no doubt contributed to where we are today. But what about the rest of the West? The US was not, and is not, the only player then and now. I'm sure this is a longer conversation than we want to take on. But I take your point about those years when the US was in its "crusader mentality." I lived in Western Europe at that time and it was sometimes complicated, but it was also a good time to listen.
Meaning no disrespect, and welcoming rebuttal, but...
Putin has long since proven beyond any doubt that he is a psychopath. That's the problem here, not any shoulda, coulda, woulda about the West. Apologies, but your thinking here suffers from predictable excessive sophistication, and the usual unfortunate habit of shifting the focus of blame on to the good guys.
You write, "I'm not excusing Putin from any of his crimes."
Nine words. Followed by numerous paragraphs of blame shifting. It's Iraq war critic thinking all over again. Tiresome.
The Ukrainians understand with great clarity what the solution to rabid dogs like Putin is.
Please reread the question I was asked. I was answering directly the question that was put to me: what exactly could we could have done better? Replying with a mantra about how bad Putin is would have not been a good faith answer to that question. Having served in Ukraine for seven years in the 1990's and 2000's, I have plenty of opinions on how bad Putin is -- believe me.
Thanks for your reply, and apologies if I got a bit carried away.
You write, "The critical error, however, was the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was based on false intelligence, destroyed a Putin ally in the Middle East, and convinced him both through our rhetoric and actions that we were the enemy, out to spread our writ across the world by any means necessary."
1) The invasion of Iraq is why we don't today see a nuclear arms race between Iraq and Iran. In 20 years I've yet to see a single Iraq war critic admit this, no matter how expert they are (thus, as you can see, I'm struggling to maintain patience and decorum)
2) We should be destroying Putin allies where possible.
3) We are the enemy of all dictatorships on the planet, as Biden is wisely articulating.
4) We are out to spread democracy around the world where ever we can.
What you see as a "critical error" failure of the West I see as progress in the right direction.
Obama said, "Russia as a “smaller,” “weaker country” that does not “produce anything that anybody wants to buy except oil and gas and arms"
That is an accurate statement. The combined GDP of the West is 20 to 30 times that of Russia.
I will agree the West did make mistakes. We should have confronted Putin much earlier. The WWII generation is now gone, so we're having to learn the lessons they died for over again.
It's not a "mantra" to label Putin a psychopath, it's an accurate diagnosis which instructs us how to proceed. There's no point in any form of accommodation. There never was. The mistake we made was in not understanding that sooner.
The West should have been involved in the color revolutions if it wasn't. We should unapologetically seek to undermine dictatorships where ever we can, as a general principle.
I'm not really qualified to evaluate that blog, but first impression it looks pretty informed and professional. Feedback welcome.
As to Gershkovich, I dunno, I guess we should consider him a war zone reporter who got too close to the fighting. This event will likely boost his career, but the price tag could be steep indeed. I'm not aware of his reporting, so I don't know if he was telling any stories worth risking his life for. My vote, let the intelligence agencies handle it.
One thing about Putin's KGB, and now the FSB, is that while they are naturally attracted to any target of opportunity, they focus particularly on foreigners who are descended from Russian emigres and do not have diplomatic immunity. For this reason, they might have concentrated their attention on Evan Gershkovich, since he was descended from Soviet emigres and he clearly knew his way around -- perhaps too well.
It should be noted that before Evan, the last US correspondent to be arrested for espionage, Nicholas Daniloff (1986), also had Russian roots. In Daniloff's case, it was a straight up hostage situation, and he was traded within a few weeks for a Russian spy caught in an FBI sting operation.
I also wonder if the FSB is doing more than just banking hostages. It may have been let off the leash, and is pursuing targets wherever its paranoia leads it. Julia Ioffe posits that when the ICC approved an arrest warrant for Putin as a war criminal, something may have snapped. If this turns out to be the case, it will have implications for all foreigners remaining in Russia.
My contacts tell me that besides being a brilliant reporter, Evan also took risks that others might not. I'm not sure what the rules are these days, but he reportedly did a lot of traveling alone. He was investigating a story about PMC Wagner, but according to some accounts he also went to Nizhniy Tagil, the site of Russia's largest tank factory, just before being arrested in Yekaterinburg.
The FSB must have had its eye on him for a long time, and it wouldn't have taken too much to send their paranoia into overdrive. These days, for all we know, the FSB might consider normal journalistic research to be espionage.
I'm sure additional information will come to light that will enable more than speculation about why the Russians arrested Evan. Until then, we can hope the Russians might be thinking of a trade. The rub: there is no Russian prisoner in the US whose name springs immediately to mind.
One thing is for sure: Evan is not a spy, and never has been.
Is everyone really oblivious to the true reason he was arrested? It took Putin three years to serve his dish of revenge. This was personal. But Putin’s timing made his motivation transparently obvious.
Perhaps it would be useful if you explained what you think the true reason was behind Gershkovich's arrest.
Here you go. I really did think it was obvious. Maybe not.
https://michaelmcfaul.substack.com/p/mcfauls-world-2023-year-in-review/comment/49163825?r=2v4r8f&utm_medium=ios
That's an interesting theory, but in such cases journalists who offend the authorities by investigating corruption or worse are usually not arrested, they are murdered (Jones, Starovoitova, Klebnikov, Politkovskaya, Shchekochikhin) or have unfortunate accidents (Borovik). In the absence of any real connecting evidence between the two cases (say testimony that Putin was personally monitoring the Gershkovich arrest or that the arrest was timed to the sentencing of Roldugin's money launderers) equally valid theories would include harvesting potential trade bait, or the simple fact that under Putin the FSB is being allowed to run wild. https://cpj.org/europe/russia/
Of course he is trade bait. Putin even spelled out exactly who he wants in return during the Tucker Carlson interview but he was just trolling. That assassin will not be released by the Germans. Did you read Evan’s Moscow Times article btw? I understand it made Evan’s mother very nervous. With good reason. On March 30, 2023 it was reported both that the money launderers were sentenced and that Evan had gone missing. And there ARE news reports that Putin was personally monitoring Evan’s arrest. No “testimony” from Putin or FSB about that little operation on March 30 and it is very unlikely there ever will be.
Putin does not want another Gareth Jones.
I find stories like Evan's chilling, because when I was working on civil society issues in Russia and Ukraine, I traveled widely in both countries, almost exclusively on my own, and I sometimes found myself in what felt to me like setups. These ranged from being pressured to accept a USB drive without being allowed to review its contents to being put in a situation where I would have to violate seemingly trivial visa restrictions if I wanted to spend an extra night in a city.
Of course, as Mike points out in his essay, the FSB doesn't really need a reason to arrest you, because there isn't really any such thing as "the law" in Russia. However, they do seem to like a pretext, however flimsy, either as a way of demonstrating their contempt for the very idea of legality, or just as a demonstration of how dangerous it is even for foreigners to be anything other than a creature of the Putin regime.
As far as the color revolutions are concerned, it was my experience that Western assistance didn't cause them, but did play a significant role in their success. What's most important to remember about the color revolutions is that they weren't overnight phenomena; they happened in the context of anywhere from 20-25 years' growth of independent civil society.
Many Western countries contributed (relatively small) financial support support for things like building independent parliaments, election monitoring groups, public opinion polling, efforts to engage youth in their countries' civic lives, and so forth. In Ukraine, the case with which I am most familiar, this financial support allowed civil society leaders to build up a reserve of legitimacy and trust with the public.
Thus, when the Kuchma administration (which nobody in Ukraine trusted anyway) tried to waltz blatantly falsified election returns past the public in the second round of the 2004 presidential election, a figure like the late and much-lamented Ilko Kucheriv could go on TV and discuss his foundation's independent election polling for a few minutes, setting off protests that brought the country to a halt for weeks.
Although it's tempting to call these protests "instantaneous," because of the context I mentioned above, they really weren't. They were more like a sudden intensification of an extended period of civic activism.
Of course, there were figures within Ukraine that tried to take advantage of the situation (SOMEBODY must have paid for all those orange flags, for example), but in the main the protests were spontaneous and reflected not just a sense of dissatisfaction, but also a sense that dissatisfaction could be channeled productively. In my view, western aid had its greatest success by fostering this sense of empowerment.
Do you think that Gershkovich’s parents being immigrants from the late 1970s Jewish exodus program could have played a role in Putin’s choice here as well? They are described as “fleeing” the USSR which is a common term of that era, but I just wondered if this might play a role in conjunction with all of the other factors.
How do we reconcile Putin's hatred of democracy and those comments he made about being open to Russia joining NATO? Surely he knew then that the "European culture" he spoke of was democratic and open, not to mention, NATO isn't really about "culture." Seems like his NATO comments were just blowing smoke.
It was early days for Putin then. He was inexperienced and feeling his way. He probably said a lot of things early on that reflected more a loyalty to Yeltsin than his own views. Above all, he had not yet consolidated power, and that was his chief concern. This changed rapidly. By 2005, he was
turning against the US, which was taking actions without considering Russian interests (ABM Treaty abrogation, invasion of Iraq, NATO expansion, etc.). Putin's paranoia was also getting the better of him. He felt surrounded and may not have believed the US was offering Russia sufficient support in the war against terror (Beslan, Chechnya, etc.). He also began to see the US as being behind the color revolutions sweeping parts of the former Soviet Union, and viewed this as a direct threat to his own power. In short, we could have done better.
Could have done better how? The West wasn't behind the color revolutions, and there's evidence that Putin and the FSB were behind some of the "terrorism" in Russia (e.g., the Moscow apartment bombing). Would like to hear more on how we could have done better in these areas (genuine question, not being argumentative!).
good points
I'm not excusing Putin from any of his crimes. I do believe, however, that we could have had far better results if we had been more realistic in our approach to Russia.
You will note that I didn't say we were behind the color revolutions. What I said was "He [Putin] began to see the US as being behind the color revolutions..." Of course, what he thought he saw did not correspond with reality. The problem was that our past behavior made it very easy for him to draw that conclusion.
In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, we could have done much more under the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations to steer Russia under Yeltsin in a more democratic direction. Still worse, we became afflicted by triumphalism and increasingly adopted the view that Russia no longer counted. Even as late as 2016, President Obama, who should have known better, dismissed Russia as a “smaller,” “weaker country” that does not “produce anything that anybody wants to buy except oil and gas and arms...” https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/obama-russia-weaker-country-232759
The worst mistakes were committed by the George W. Bush administration -- errors that made it easy for Putin to come to the conclusion that the US was the enemy. After 9/11, the US turned into a messianic hyperpower, and we began taking unilateral actions that would have serious consequences later on. Some of these could have been better managed. For example, there was no need to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. We could have handled NATO expansion differently (while expanding all the same). We could have paid more attention to Russia's actual problems with terrorism (Beslan, Nord Ost, suicide bombers). The critical error, however, was the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was based on false intelligence, destroyed a Putin ally in the Middle East, and convinced him both through our rhetoric and actions that we were the enemy, out to spread our writ across the world by any means necessary.
We had a crusading mentality. As one Bush national security staffer put it: "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do." https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/faith-certainty-and-the-presidency-of-george-w-bush.html .
Pride goeth before a fall.
Thanks for the response. All of these things no doubt contributed to where we are today. But what about the rest of the West? The US was not, and is not, the only player then and now. I'm sure this is a longer conversation than we want to take on. But I take your point about those years when the US was in its "crusader mentality." I lived in Western Europe at that time and it was sometimes complicated, but it was also a good time to listen.
Meaning no disrespect, and welcoming rebuttal, but...
Putin has long since proven beyond any doubt that he is a psychopath. That's the problem here, not any shoulda, coulda, woulda about the West. Apologies, but your thinking here suffers from predictable excessive sophistication, and the usual unfortunate habit of shifting the focus of blame on to the good guys.
You write, "I'm not excusing Putin from any of his crimes."
Nine words. Followed by numerous paragraphs of blame shifting. It's Iraq war critic thinking all over again. Tiresome.
The Ukrainians understand with great clarity what the solution to rabid dogs like Putin is.
Please reread the question I was asked. I was answering directly the question that was put to me: what exactly could we could have done better? Replying with a mantra about how bad Putin is would have not been a good faith answer to that question. Having served in Ukraine for seven years in the 1990's and 2000's, I have plenty of opinions on how bad Putin is -- believe me.
Thanks for your reply, and apologies if I got a bit carried away.
You write, "The critical error, however, was the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was based on false intelligence, destroyed a Putin ally in the Middle East, and convinced him both through our rhetoric and actions that we were the enemy, out to spread our writ across the world by any means necessary."
1) The invasion of Iraq is why we don't today see a nuclear arms race between Iraq and Iran. In 20 years I've yet to see a single Iraq war critic admit this, no matter how expert they are (thus, as you can see, I'm struggling to maintain patience and decorum)
2) We should be destroying Putin allies where possible.
3) We are the enemy of all dictatorships on the planet, as Biden is wisely articulating.
4) We are out to spread democracy around the world where ever we can.
What you see as a "critical error" failure of the West I see as progress in the right direction.
Obama said, "Russia as a “smaller,” “weaker country” that does not “produce anything that anybody wants to buy except oil and gas and arms"
That is an accurate statement. The combined GDP of the West is 20 to 30 times that of Russia.
I will agree the West did make mistakes. We should have confronted Putin much earlier. The WWII generation is now gone, so we're having to learn the lessons they died for over again.
It's not a "mantra" to label Putin a psychopath, it's an accurate diagnosis which instructs us how to proceed. There's no point in any form of accommodation. There never was. The mistake we made was in not understanding that sooner.
The West should have been involved in the color revolutions if it wasn't. We should unapologetically seek to undermine dictatorships where ever we can, as a general principle.
We reconcile all of Putin's statements simply be recognizing that all his comments are just blowing smoke. Listen to what he does, not what he says.
I found an interesting blog yesterday for those interested in news out of Russia. Not about Russia, out of Russia.
https://ironcurtain.substack.com/
I'm not really qualified to evaluate that blog, but first impression it looks pretty informed and professional. Feedback welcome.
As to Gershkovich, I dunno, I guess we should consider him a war zone reporter who got too close to the fighting. This event will likely boost his career, but the price tag could be steep indeed. I'm not aware of his reporting, so I don't know if he was telling any stories worth risking his life for. My vote, let the intelligence agencies handle it.
The Wall Street Journal has taken all of his stories out from behind the paywall so everyone can read them. https://www.wsj.com/news/author/evan-gershkovich?page=1&fbclid=IwAR0UV18r9vl_0oMk_GDD-FreR-k352sGQKwTSBkegLWVQR4OcbafP5yXq2M