Context for the Guessing Game about the Ukrainian Counteroffensive.

No matter what happens next, Russia has already lost the war. The only question now is how badly.

As the Ukrainian counteroffensive gears up, some analysts and government officials have already placed their bets on who will win, how far it will go, and when “peace” negotiations can begin. This parlor game is dangerous, first because it assumes a quick endgame, and second, because it removes this next phase of battles from the larger context of how winners and losers of this war should be assessed.

Regarding the immediate endgame of the current counteroffensive, many assume that this is the big and final event in this war. That could be. I certainly hope it will be. But it is equally plausible that the Ukrainian counteroffensive underway right now is just the next chapter – not the final chapter – in this war. Tragically, there are likely to be many counteroffensives going forward, not just one now. Ukraine is set to receive all kinds of new equipment in the coming months, including Abrams tanks and F-16 fighter jets. Hopefully, the Biden administration will also decide to provide Ukraine with longer-range missile systems like the ATACMs. That door is still open. So why wouldn’t President Zelenskyy and his team plan another counteroffensive when this new equipment arrives? Assuming that the war ends and peace talks begin after this next offensive push is both analytically wrong but also prescriptively dangerous. Western leaders should not artificially set a deadline on when Ukraine should negotiate, but rather let Zelenskyy and other democratically elected representatives of the Ukrainian people make that decision. And by the way, Putin most certainly has not signaled that he will be ready to negotiate once this counteroffensive is over.

In the U.S., many also assume that American public support for military assistance to Ukraine will dry up as we get closer to the election cycle. And that’s why this counteroffensive must be the last one, so the logic goes. I’m not so sure. Especially if this current counteroffensive produces positive results, does the Republican Party really want to be blamed for capitulating to Putin? Even if Donald Trump wins re-election next year, the U.S. is not a monarchy; U.S. Congress and the American people will have a say in determining the future of military assistance to Ukraine. And even if, God forbid, American military support decreases, our European allies still might stay the course. Most importantly, Ukrainians will keep fighting and keep launching counteroffensives with or without American weapons. They fought without our weapons to defend Kyiv last year. They will fight without weapons again if forced to do so again. To assume that everything must wrap up at the end of the current counteroffensive because of American domestic politics seems premature.

When it comes to characterizing winning and losing, the current counteroffensive must be understood within the fuller history of this war so far. No matter how much territory Ukraine takes back in these current battles, Ukraine has already won the broader war. Only a catastrophic failure by the Ukrainian armed forces or a miraculous strengthening of the Russian armed forces could change the general tractory of this war. Both are unlikely.

Source: Wiki Commons.

Before launching a massive full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Putin clearly outlined his goals.  To understand his war aims,  Putin’s hour-long address on February 21, 2022, is especially worth re-watching. After 471 days of waging war, terrorism, and crimes against humanity, Putin has failed badly to achieve any of his key objectives.

First, Putin sought to unite the Slavic people because, in his view, Ukraine is not a real country and Ukrainians are just Russians with accents. He failed miserably, instead accelerating the divide. Since the onset of the war, Ukrainians’ unity and their commitment to democracy and freedom only solidified. According to the International Republican Institute’s National Survey of Ukraine from February 1, 2023, 97 percent of Ukrainians are confident that Ukraine will win the war, and 74 percent of Ukrainians state that Ukraine will maintain all territories within its 1991 internationally recognized borders. The geopolitical alignment of Ukrainians is now more unified too. 85 percent of Ukrainians (89 percent in the West, 86 percent in the Center, 84 percent in the South, and 80 percent in the East) want to be part of the European Union. Almost no one wants to join the Eurasian Economic Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (less than one percent overall, in the West, Center, and South; three percent in the East). Culturally, Ukrainians are also shifting away from anything Soviet or Russian: symbols, monuments, language, literature, religion. According to Harvard historian Serhii Plokhii, “What we certainly witness today is an extremely important moment in the birth of a new Ukrainian nation and really formation of a new type of Ukrainian state."

Second, Putin invaded to “de-nazify” Ukraine, that is overthrow a democratically elected president Zelenskyy and Verkhovna Rada, and install a pro-Russia puppet. He failed. Zelenskyy is still in power. Ukrainian democracy still endures. If before the escalation of the war in 2022, both citizens of Ukraine and policymakers in Washington had doubts about the comedian-turned-president (in February 2022, only 24.6 percent of Ukrainians supported Zelenskyy), three days after Putin invaded sovereign Ukraine, Zelenskyy’s approval skyrocketed to over 91%. His approval rating remains high. As of February 1, 2023, 95 percent of Ukrainians approve of President Zelenskyy’s performance.

Third, Putin aimed to “demilitarize” Ukraine. Again, he has failed completely. The Ukrainian army is now better armed than ever before. The Biden administration and the U.S. Congress allocated $76.8 billion in assistance to Ukraine, including $46.6 billion in military assistance. Similarly, the EU and its member-states have also provided over $75 billion in economic, military, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, leading in the provision of economic aid. Ukraine is now transitioning away from old Soviet and Russian platforms and adopting advanced Western weapons systems at a fantastic speed. Over time, as I wrote here, Ukraine will emerge from this tragic war as one of, if not the best-trained, best-equipped, and largest militaries in democratic Europe.

Fourth, Putin argued unconvincingly that he had to invade Ukraine to stop NATO expansion. (On why that argument was unconvincing, read my piece with Robert Person in the Journal of Democracy, titled “What Putin Fears Most,” here: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putin-fears-most/.) Again, he failed, prompting just the opposite. Shortly after the start of the war, three countries – Ukraine, Sweden, and Finland – filed their applications for membership. On April 4, 2023, Finland became an alliance member, which resulted in Russia now sharing a new  1,340 km- (832 mile-) border with NATO. Sweden is set to follow soon. Ukraine today is more integrated with NATO than ever before. And last Friday, as Secretary of State Tony Blinken affirmed, “NATO’s door remains open to new members, and it will stay open.” Ukrainian membership in NATO is much more likely now than it was before the war.

Moreover, Putin’s barbaric invasion has made NATO much stronger. Hours after Russian forces entered Ukraine in 2022, Allied powers activated NATO's defensive Response Force, strengthening its eastern flank with extra troops, aircraft, and ships. NATO has also established its first permanent military presence in Poland. Many more NATO soldiers now will remain stationed closer to Russia’s border than prior to the war. 

Fifth, via military occupation and defection of Ukrainian intelligence officers, Putin aimed to seize control of all of Ukraine, as Stalin did in Eastern Europe after 1945. This Putin plan mostly failed too. Putin’s army failed to capture Kyiv in what was supposed to be a 48-hour Blitzkrieg, Kharkiv, or retain control over major cities on Ukrainian territories he annexed on paper last September, like Kherson. According to the Institute for the Study of War, by mid-November of 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces had recaptured roughly 54% of the territory occupied by Russian soldiers.

Sixth, Putin aimed to pull Ukraine back into Russia’s sphere of influence. Regarding this goal, he has failed catastrophically. Putin’s unprovoked war has accelerated Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO. Ukraine is now anchored in Europe permanently. 

Putin has achieved one small objective. Russian armed forces today do occupy more Ukrainian territory than 471 days ago. But as Ukraine’s counteroffensive begins to roll out, even this most minimalist achievement is now under threat.  

And this one small “success” has come at a high cost to other core Russian interests. Is Russia richer today than 471 days ago? No. International sanctions, a mass exodus of foreign companies, and the emigration of tens of thousands of Russia’s best and brightest already have damaged the Russian economy and will continue to impede economic growth for years if not decades. Does Russia have a stronger army? No. It will take years, if not decades, for the Russian Armed Forces to return to its pre-war capacities. Moreover, Putin’s war exposed how weak the Russian army really was. Before the war, NATO leaders worried about a Russian army marching again through Europe as they had done in previous centuries. That threat has diminished greatly now. The war also has fueled deep divisions between Russian intelligence and military officers, as well as between regular Russian soldiers and private mercenaries. Is Russia today more respected in the world? No. While Russia still enjoys some support, Europe has nearly eliminated its dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Does Putin enjoy greater respect from Xi? No. There are definitely limits to this “no limit” friendship, as I wrote earlier here.

So, no matter what happens next in new battles, Russia has already lost the war. Moving forward, it's just a question of how badly Russia loses.