I published this piece in the Washington Post yesterday. It’s very speculative. Predicting the future is hard for social scientists and intelligence officers alike. But we are asked to do so by both government officials and the media & public audiences all the time. I was asked by the editors at Wapo to do so. So I did. Very curious to hear your reactions as I intend to write a longer article on the subject.
Sir, you are a very skilled writer. I learn from you every day. I can’t criticize anything you said about Putin or Russia. I was fascinated by the lines “The older, more rural, less educated and poorer support Putin in greater numbers than the younger, more urban, more educated, wealthier Russians. Putin is losing the future.” You may have as well been talking about trumpism and America.
Your assessment seems to me to be rather spot on, at least from my own Hungarian vantage point.
Yes, Putin is probably going stay, and slowly peter out, much in the way of the years after Brezhnev.
But the question seems to be what is that petering out going to be like.
What effect will the warlords have? What do you make of these private armies? What hold does the KGB-FSB, the Pretorian guard or the military have on both society and these armies?
Will the veterans and the mothers of war dead have any major influence?
The Russian ability to recuperate is legendary. Is that a resource not underestimated today? Who can wield it? A new Putin? Is the end of Putinism really to be reckoned with? Does Putinism really differ from Russian state power as we know it form history? Is the traditional fear Smuta a force?
How is Putin going to face the coming presidential elections if he cannot at least achieve a frozen conflict in Ukraine in the absence of any likeness of victory? There is a sense of facing a major turning point in the war after Ramstein. If this is true, how does this relate to your thesis of an imminent end of Putinism?
I hope you’ll find the time answer my Hungary question.
Hi. Some excellent comments here on a good essay by Dr. McFaul. I take the long view of this... In some sense Putin has been irrelevant for some time. He is 70 and that is not young in Russian terms. He might be ill, who knows? Clearly, he has made an enormous mistake here, but Putinism and Putin are not the same thing. He came to power nearly a generation ago. He has controlled the media for at least 15 years. He rewrote history books for kids at about the same time. I have seen evidence of this in my university history classroom in the US. So, Putin will go, but the real question is - how long will Putinism last? His blunder is clear, but his underlying hyper nationalist, Orthodox, anti-western attitudes I fear have been entrenched in a new generation of people and will persist...
Your WoPo piece made some very important points, and I'm sure an expanded article can build on them. They are points I’ve been mulling over for a while now.
The first point is that Putin has already lost, and he knows it. It was a dumb idea to invade Ukraine in the first place. They had already kicked Russian puppets out twice before, so the idea that they would roll over and let Russia take the country was just nuts. The best day of Putin’s life (or last good day) was 23 February 2022. There will be no more good days.
What would winning the war for Russia look like? I doubt if there is a drop of Slavic fraternity for Russia left in Ukraine outside the Lavra. They would control some territory but fight an endless insurgency, and the West would be happy to supply whatever support needed. This would be the Russian misadventure in Afghanistan on steroids. And this will not take as long as the Afghan debacle before the Russians retreat across the border with their tail between their legs.
We need to do everything possible to help the Ukrainians liberate all of their country, including Crimea. Offensive weapons from the West will speed up this process and bring it to the inevitable conclusion much quicker, saving countless lives. Of course, this will be a loss for Russia beyond what they had control of in February 2022.
Following the victory, as we help Ukraine rebuild its country, it will be firmly rooted in the West, exactly what Putin was trying to stop. If not a member of NATO, we will provide them with a robust defense so that the Russians will not think of invading again. It will be in Europe’s interest to lead this rebuilding so that the refugees have a home to return to.
What of Russia? They will have lost a war, territory, and thousands of lives for nothing. Their leaders will be hounded by human rights tribunals, kept under sanctions with a crumbling economy, and humiliated. Can anyone imagine a Western world leader in the future meeting with Putin and welcoming him back into the family of nations?
The answer lies in what you, Ambassador McFaul, and others offered Russia when the Berlin wall came down. Create a transparent, liberal democracy with the rule of law, basic freedoms, and human rights. I would add that now Russia will need to demilitarize as well. The model could be the Baltics, Eastern Europe, or even post-war Germany (without the occupation). The Russians will need to make these changes, but as any student of history knows, change can happen very quickly. In the last seventy years, how many carefully constructed dictatorships have we seen blown away like a house of cards in a windstorm, the USSR included?
Thanks for the interesting summary. I'd appreciate hearing your thoughts on what all of this might mean for Putin's behavior in the near future, i.e., whether his increasing isolation/disapproval ratings might make him increasingly more aggressive and unpredictable. And does he really have another couple hundred thousand troops to deploy, or will that require another mobilization?
My own sense is that Putin still has a long way to fall before we can talk about his possible removal from power. Russia would first have to be defeated and expelled from Ukraine, and sanctions would have to bite much harder than they have so far. Neither of these two conditions are likely to be met in the short run, but a year or two from now the ground might be ready for a palace coup of some sort.
For Putin to be vulnerable, however, he would also have to lose popular support. The problem is that much of the Russian public has been zombified. Putin can still count on everyone who watches television for their news -- the rural population and the over 50 crowd. Putin's real problem is with the urban youth who get their news from VPN-connected Signal, Telegram, etc. They know the score, but as long as conditions remain passable in places like Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the penalties for dissent are draconian, they will largely remain passive, or try to avoid any personal consequences of Putin's disastrous war.
Predicting a precise time for Putin's political or actual demise is about as reliable as predicting when a mafia clan war will erupt in New York. It's unlikely in the short run, but it always happens eventually. Putin could die in bed, surrounded by fearful courtiers, like Stalin. Or, Putin's criminal confederates might one day sense weakness and turn on him to ensure their own survival. I doubt, however, that he will go quietly. He will not submit as easily as Khrushchev did to a Politburo summons. After all, he has spent the last two decades building up a Praetorian Guard to avoid that possibility (he might worry about who he puts in charge of his personal security, however). If push comes to shove, he might also, like Stalin, resort to purges and a campaign of fear to keep himself in power. But something will happen eventually. Something always does.
Meanwhile, the mood in Moscow is uncertain. Pantsir missiles are popping up on Moscow roofs. Putin is hunkered down in his bunker, and the war, slowly but surely, is coming home. There's no exit. At best, Putin can look forward to the life of a pariah, ruling a pariah state.
Ambassador, a thoughtful piece. Last year, I read an encyclopedic novel - not the Beaver Stalingrad, but the Vassily Grossman Stalingrad, which was amazing story telling. Thinking about that with the debacle of the Ukraine War layered on, the question left is whether Putin will be able to bend the whole country to view Ukraine as existential opportunity. How certain are you that he won't be able to do that?
Here's a gift link for the article - I'm a big fan of the Ambassador - so glad to help.
https://wapo.st/3DggYni
Sir, you are a very skilled writer. I learn from you every day. I can’t criticize anything you said about Putin or Russia. I was fascinated by the lines “The older, more rural, less educated and poorer support Putin in greater numbers than the younger, more urban, more educated, wealthier Russians. Putin is losing the future.” You may have as well been talking about trumpism and America.
Sir,
Your assessment seems to me to be rather spot on, at least from my own Hungarian vantage point.
Yes, Putin is probably going stay, and slowly peter out, much in the way of the years after Brezhnev.
But the question seems to be what is that petering out going to be like.
What effect will the warlords have? What do you make of these private armies? What hold does the KGB-FSB, the Pretorian guard or the military have on both society and these armies?
Will the veterans and the mothers of war dead have any major influence?
The Russian ability to recuperate is legendary. Is that a resource not underestimated today? Who can wield it? A new Putin? Is the end of Putinism really to be reckoned with? Does Putinism really differ from Russian state power as we know it form history? Is the traditional fear Smuta a force?
How is Putin going to face the coming presidential elections if he cannot at least achieve a frozen conflict in Ukraine in the absence of any likeness of victory? There is a sense of facing a major turning point in the war after Ramstein. If this is true, how does this relate to your thesis of an imminent end of Putinism?
I hope you’ll find the time answer my Hungary question.
Slava Ukraine!
Hi. Some excellent comments here on a good essay by Dr. McFaul. I take the long view of this... In some sense Putin has been irrelevant for some time. He is 70 and that is not young in Russian terms. He might be ill, who knows? Clearly, he has made an enormous mistake here, but Putinism and Putin are not the same thing. He came to power nearly a generation ago. He has controlled the media for at least 15 years. He rewrote history books for kids at about the same time. I have seen evidence of this in my university history classroom in the US. So, Putin will go, but the real question is - how long will Putinism last? His blunder is clear, but his underlying hyper nationalist, Orthodox, anti-western attitudes I fear have been entrenched in a new generation of people and will persist...
Your WoPo piece made some very important points, and I'm sure an expanded article can build on them. They are points I’ve been mulling over for a while now.
The first point is that Putin has already lost, and he knows it. It was a dumb idea to invade Ukraine in the first place. They had already kicked Russian puppets out twice before, so the idea that they would roll over and let Russia take the country was just nuts. The best day of Putin’s life (or last good day) was 23 February 2022. There will be no more good days.
What would winning the war for Russia look like? I doubt if there is a drop of Slavic fraternity for Russia left in Ukraine outside the Lavra. They would control some territory but fight an endless insurgency, and the West would be happy to supply whatever support needed. This would be the Russian misadventure in Afghanistan on steroids. And this will not take as long as the Afghan debacle before the Russians retreat across the border with their tail between their legs.
We need to do everything possible to help the Ukrainians liberate all of their country, including Crimea. Offensive weapons from the West will speed up this process and bring it to the inevitable conclusion much quicker, saving countless lives. Of course, this will be a loss for Russia beyond what they had control of in February 2022.
Following the victory, as we help Ukraine rebuild its country, it will be firmly rooted in the West, exactly what Putin was trying to stop. If not a member of NATO, we will provide them with a robust defense so that the Russians will not think of invading again. It will be in Europe’s interest to lead this rebuilding so that the refugees have a home to return to.
What of Russia? They will have lost a war, territory, and thousands of lives for nothing. Their leaders will be hounded by human rights tribunals, kept under sanctions with a crumbling economy, and humiliated. Can anyone imagine a Western world leader in the future meeting with Putin and welcoming him back into the family of nations?
The answer lies in what you, Ambassador McFaul, and others offered Russia when the Berlin wall came down. Create a transparent, liberal democracy with the rule of law, basic freedoms, and human rights. I would add that now Russia will need to demilitarize as well. The model could be the Baltics, Eastern Europe, or even post-war Germany (without the occupation). The Russians will need to make these changes, but as any student of history knows, change can happen very quickly. In the last seventy years, how many carefully constructed dictatorships have we seen blown away like a house of cards in a windstorm, the USSR included?
Thanks for the interesting summary. I'd appreciate hearing your thoughts on what all of this might mean for Putin's behavior in the near future, i.e., whether his increasing isolation/disapproval ratings might make him increasingly more aggressive and unpredictable. And does he really have another couple hundred thousand troops to deploy, or will that require another mobilization?
My own sense is that Putin still has a long way to fall before we can talk about his possible removal from power. Russia would first have to be defeated and expelled from Ukraine, and sanctions would have to bite much harder than they have so far. Neither of these two conditions are likely to be met in the short run, but a year or two from now the ground might be ready for a palace coup of some sort.
For Putin to be vulnerable, however, he would also have to lose popular support. The problem is that much of the Russian public has been zombified. Putin can still count on everyone who watches television for their news -- the rural population and the over 50 crowd. Putin's real problem is with the urban youth who get their news from VPN-connected Signal, Telegram, etc. They know the score, but as long as conditions remain passable in places like Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the penalties for dissent are draconian, they will largely remain passive, or try to avoid any personal consequences of Putin's disastrous war.
Predicting a precise time for Putin's political or actual demise is about as reliable as predicting when a mafia clan war will erupt in New York. It's unlikely in the short run, but it always happens eventually. Putin could die in bed, surrounded by fearful courtiers, like Stalin. Or, Putin's criminal confederates might one day sense weakness and turn on him to ensure their own survival. I doubt, however, that he will go quietly. He will not submit as easily as Khrushchev did to a Politburo summons. After all, he has spent the last two decades building up a Praetorian Guard to avoid that possibility (he might worry about who he puts in charge of his personal security, however). If push comes to shove, he might also, like Stalin, resort to purges and a campaign of fear to keep himself in power. But something will happen eventually. Something always does.
Meanwhile, the mood in Moscow is uncertain. Pantsir missiles are popping up on Moscow roofs. Putin is hunkered down in his bunker, and the war, slowly but surely, is coming home. There's no exit. At best, Putin can look forward to the life of a pariah, ruling a pariah state.
Yes. Would love to read, but behind a paywall.
Ambassador, a thoughtful piece. Last year, I read an encyclopedic novel - not the Beaver Stalingrad, but the Vassily Grossman Stalingrad, which was amazing story telling. Thinking about that with the debacle of the Ukraine War layered on, the question left is whether Putin will be able to bend the whole country to view Ukraine as existential opportunity. How certain are you that he won't be able to do that?